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CONSUMER SENSITIVITY TO INTEREST RATES:
AN EMPilUCAL STUDY OF NEW-CAR BUYERS
AND AUTO LOANS
James J. White* and Frank W. Munger, Jr.**
!.

lNTRODUCilON

it has never been clear whether the consumer needs
to be protected from his own folly or from the rapaciousness
of those who feed on him, consumer protection is a topic of intense
current interest in the courts, in the legislatures, and in the law
schools. A number of recent court decisions have attempted to attack problems confronting the consumer; 1 unfortunately, these judicial efforts have succeeded primarily in disclosing the limitations
in the courts' ability to deal with such problems. State and federal
legislative bodies have pursued more carefully designed remedies.
Congress has passed the Truth-in-Lending Act; 2 the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws has proposed the
Uniform Consumer Credit Code; 3 and many states have enacted
retail installment sales acts 4 to update and supplement their long-
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I. See, e.g., the landmark decisions in Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co.,
!150 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Unico v. Owen, 50 N.J. 101, 232 A.2d 405 (1967). See also
Ellsworth Dobbs, Inc. v. Johnson, 50 N.J. 528, 236 A.2d 843 (1967); American Home
Improvement, Inc. v. Madver, 105 N.H. 435, 201 A.2d 886 (1964); and cases cited in
Annot., 17 AL.R.3d 1010, 1136-38 (1968).
2. Consumer Credit Protection Act, May 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146,
15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-77 (Supp. V, 1965-1969) [hereinafter CCPA].
!l. UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CoDE (rev. final draft 1969) [hereinafter UCCC]. The
UCCC has been adopted by Colorado, H. 1076, [1971] Colorado Laws (1 CCH CoNSUMER CREDIT GUIDE 11 4770, at 5005 (1971)); Idaho, ch. 299, (1971] Idaho Laws (1 CCH
CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE 11 4770, at 5005 (1971)); Indiana, IND. CODE 1971, tit. 24, art. 4.5,
§§1-101 to 6-202; Oklahoma, 14 OKLA. STAT. ANN., tit. 14A, §§ 1-101 to 9-103 (Supp.
1970); Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 70B-l-101 to -9-103 (Supp. 1969); and Wyoming, ch.
191, (1971] Wyoming Laws (1 CCH CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE 1! 4770, at 5005 (1971)).
4. See, e.g., the Michigan Retail Installment Sales Act enacted in 1966, MICH. STAT.
ANN. §§ 19.416(101) to (122) (Supp. 1971). Thirty-two states have installment sales acts
covering most consumer goods (including motor vehicles), as compiled in scattered
sections of the CCH CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE under the respective state headings:
Alaska, Calif., Colo., Conn., Del., Fla., Ga., Hawaii, Ill., Ind., Kan., Ky., Md., Mass.,
Mich., Mo., Mont., Neb., Nev., N.J., N.M., N.Y., N.D., Ohio, Okla., Ore., Pa., R.I.,
Texas, Utah, Vt., '\\Tash. Thirteen states and the District of Columbia have acts
covering only motor vehicles. See CCH CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE under the following
headings: Ariz., D.C., Iowa, La., Me., Minn., Miss., N.H., N.C., S.C., S.D., Va., W.
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standing usury laws. 5 These legisJative and judicial acts have always
relied, at best, on anecdotal knowledge of consumer behavior. In
this Article we offer the results of an empirical study of a small
slice of consumer behavior in the use of installment credit.6
Va., Wis. One state, Tennessee, has an installment sales act covering most consumer
goods except motor vehicles. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 47-11-101 to -110 (1964). See 3 CCH
CoNsmrER CREDIT GumE 1111 6001-19, at 50,611-15 (1970). Only four states have no
installment sales act covering consumer goods: Ala., Ark., Idaho, "Wyo. In addition,
every state but Arkansas has enacted some form of legislation regulating small loans
to consumers. E.g., M1cH. STAT. ANN .. §§ 23.667(1)·(26) (1971). See chart in 1 CCH
CoNSU?.rER CREDIT GUIDE 1J 540, at 1603-35 (1970). And 41 states regulate installment
loans to consumers under separate statutes. E.g., MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 23.710(19l)(c),
(192), (196) (1971). See chart in I CCH CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE 11 570, at 1901-31
(1971).
5. Legislative concern for the consumer debtor is not entirely a modern develop·
ment. Usury laws have been in effect for many years in virtually every jurisdiction.
A good example is the Illinois law, enacted in 1879, Law of May 24, 1879, §§ 1-12,
[1879] Ill. Laws 184-86, amended by Law of June 17, 1891, §§ 1-8, [1891] Ill. Laws
149-50, codified in ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 74, §§ 1-11 (Smith-Hurd 1966). A typical
usury law specifies a maximum rate of simple interest-or a maximum number of
dollars per $100 of principal that may be charged per annum-and a separate
(usually higher) rate for loans under written contract. The older usury statutes
usually do not define interest, and few specifically mention installment loan rates.
Since these older usury statutes have operated to limit only "interest" rates and not
other charges that were effectively interest on the money borrowed but were not
termed interest charges in the loan agreement, the practice in making installment
loans has been to assess "financing'' or "carrying" charges in addition to "interest."
See, e.g., Petersen v. Philco Fin. Corp., 91 Idaho 644, 428 P.2d 961 (1967); Sloan v.
Sears, Roebuck &: Co., 228 Ark. 464, 308 S.W.2d 802 (1957). More recent installment
sales acts and installment loan acts have been drafted specifically to include any
type of charge, regardless of what it is called by the lender or seller, within the
maximum rate and disclosure provisions of those acts. For example, the UCCC uses
the term "credit service charge" instead of interest; the credit service charge is the
sum of all direct and indirect charges incident to the extension of credit. UCCC
§ 2.109.
6. Several empirical studies of consumer behavior in credit transactions already
exist; economists have authored most of them. See A. BROIDA, CONSUMER SURVEYS AS A
SOURCE OF INFORMATION FOR SOCIAL ACCOUNTING: THE PROBLEMS (1962); G. HABERLER,
CONSU?.rER INSTALLMENT CREDIT AND ECONOMIC FLUCTUATIONS (1942); F. JUSTER, HOUSE·
HOLD CAPITAL FORMATION AND FINANCING, 1897-1962 (1966); F. JUSTER 8: R:. SHAY, CON·
SUMER SENSITIVITY TO FINANCE RATES: AN EMPIRICAL AND ANALYTICAL INVESI'IGATION
(1964); G. KATONA, THE POWERFUL CONSUMER (1960); A. K.lssELGOFF, FACTORS AFFECT·
ING THE DEMAND FOR CONSU?.rER INSTALLMENT SALES CREDIT (1952); ·w. MoRS, CONSUMER
CREDIT FINANCE CHARGES: RATE INFORMATION AND QUOTATION (1965); W. MORS, CoN·
SUMER CREDIT THEORIES: A HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL ANALYSIS (1944); OPINION REsEARCH
CORP., NEW DIMENSIONS IN FULL SERVICE BANKING (1966); R. SHAY, NEW AUTOMOBILE
FINANCE RATES 1942-62 (1963); UNIV. OF MICHIGAN SURVEY REsEARCH CENTER, NOVEMBER
1959 INTERIM SURVEY (1959); Due, Consumer Knowledge of Installment Credit Charges,
20 J. MARKETING 162 (1955); Friedman, Using Simulation Techniques To Predict the

Behavioral Effects of New Laws: The Case of Truth-In-Lending Legislation and the
Consumer, 54 J. APPLIED PSYCH. 297 (1970); L. Hoskins, Interest Rates Paid for Automobile Credit by San Francisco Bay Area Families, Sept. 1958 (unpublished M.A.
thesis, Univ. of Calif.). To our knowledge, no one has examined the behavior of a
group of borrowers in actual transactions. But see Friedman, supra. For a more thorough discussion of the several relevant empirical studies-which we will not review
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In their recent efforts, the legislatures, by imposing new interest
rate disclosure requirements on installment lenders,7 have sought
to protect the consumer against pressures to borrow money at a
higher rate of interest than he can afford or need pay. The hope,
if not the expectation, of the drafters of such disclosure legislation
is that the consumer who is made aware of interest rates will seek
here-see ·w. MORS, CONSUMER CREI>rr FINANCE CHARGES: RATE INFORMATION AND QUOTATION (1965). In addition, economic literature contains a wealth of speculation about
the use of information by consumers and an equal amount of empirical data that
bears indirectly on the question whether finance rates are an important determinant
in the use of credit. For example, A. KlsSELGOFF, supra, presents an analysis, using
aggregate data for the United States, of the effects of such factors as loan rate, down
payment, and loan term on the use of credit. His data were unsatisfactory to explain
why consumers, or certain consumers, do not respond to particular variables. But he
was able to show that, while changes in down-payment size and interest rates on newcar loans did not have a systematic effect on the aggregate purchases of new cars
during the period he studied (1929-1941), the length of loan term did have such an
effect. This finding is amply supported by more detailed survey data collected subsequently.
7. The disclosure provisions of the UCCC and the CCPA are virtually identical.
In general, the creditor must disclose the dollar amounts to be charged a debtor, the
credits for amounts already paid, a description or identification of the amounts,
and the amounts charged in terms of a percentage of the principal. See UCCC
§§ 2.301-.313, 3.301-.312; CCPA §§ 121-29, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1631-39 (Supp. V, 1965-1969).
Both acts require that the percentage rate that is quoted to the consumer be calculated strictly in accordance with regulations adopted by the Federal Reserve Board.
UCCC §§ 2.304, 3.304; CCPA § 107, 15 U.S.C. § 1606 (Supp. V, 1965-1969). The "percentage rate" is the equivalent simple annual interest rate computed according to
one of several methods in common use by accountants prior to either act; the Federal
Reserve Board has now published tables that can be used in stating this equivalent
rate. See Bd. of Governors of the Federal Reserve System Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.5
(1970), and Annual Percentage Rate Tables for Truth-in-Lending Reg. Z (1969). The
purpose in requiring a creditor or seller to state the charges on the loan in terms
of simple annual interest is to allow a consumer to make intelligent comparisons between different creditors and alternate forms of financing that were not directly
comparable prior to the acts unless one had a sophisticated knowledge of principles
of accounting. The CCPA further requires use of certain terminology, size of lettering,
and format in making the disclosure. CCPA § 122, 15 U.S.C. § 1632 (Supp. V, 1965-1969),
and Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.6(a), G), 226.7(b)-(c), 226.8(c)-(d) (1970). The UCCC contains no such provisions.
The UCCC is also designed to remove existing barriers to competition among
lenders; it is intended to replace a multiplicity of acts that now regulate different
segments of the consumer loan market in most states. The repeal of prior acts would
remove most licensing requirements for lenders now in the market, except those for
banks and credit unions and similar institutions, and would allow new lenders to
enter the loan and installment sales credit markets almost without restriction. The
only constraint on entry contained in the UCCC is the requirement that persons engaged in the business of making loans to consumers at rates of interest higher than
183 be licensed. UCCC §§ 3.201, 3.501-.502. Comments and discussion attending the
drafting of these provisions make it clear that licensing is intended to be pro forma
except in cases in which an applicant is likely to be unscrupulous or irresponsible.
The clear intent of the drafters was to maximize competition through free entry
into the market at every level. See Curran &: Fand, An Analysis of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code, 49 NEB. L. REv. 727, 728-35 (1970).
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the lowest-priced lender or will decide not to borrow.8 This migration of the consumers to the lowest-priced lender will, so the argument goes, require the higher-priced lender to reduce his rate in
order to retain his business.9 These hopes and expectations are
founded on the proposition that the consumer is largely ignorant
of the interest rate that he pays; this ignorance presumably keeps
him from going to a lender with cheaper rates. Knowledge of interest rates, it is believed, will rectify this defect and will make the
consumer credit market much more nearly perfect.
Even on its face, the assumption that consumer debtors will make
use of credit-cost information is open to serious question.10 The
typical consumer often shops first for the good he wishes to buy
and is psychologically sold on that good before he even considers
the terms of his purchase agreement.11 Current disclosure laws do
not require sellers to advertise their rates; they require only that
information be provided on the face of the loan contract.12 If the
credit-cost information is not available until after the consumer has
decided to buy, under what circumstances will the buyer use differences in interest rates to his advantage? If consumers using credit
are largely insensitive to rate differences even when they are aware
of those differences, disclosure legislation holds out a false hope. A
8. Johnson, Regulation of Finance Charges on Consumer Instalment Credit, 66
L. R:Ev. 81 (1967); Shay, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code: An Economist's
View, 54 CoRNELL L. R:Ev. 491 (1969).
9. CCPA § 102, 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (Supp. V, 1965-1969), states:
The Congress finds that economic stabilization would be enhanced and the competition among the various financial institutions and other firms engaged in the
extension of consumer credit would be strengthened by the informed use of credit.
The informed use of credit results from an awareness of the cost thereof by consumers. It is the purpose of this subcbapter to assure a meaningful disclosure of
credit terms so that the consumer will be able to compare more readily the various
credit terms available to him and avoid the uninformed use of credit.
IO. Professors Jordan and Warren acknowledge that some consumers undoubtedly
use information about finance rates to their advantage but argue that there are situations in which such information will provide little or no help to consumers seeking
credit. Jordan&: Warren, Disclosure of Finance Charges: A Rationale, 64 MICH. L. REv.
1285, 1302-03, 1321 (1966).
11. A second case described by Professors Jordan and Warren is one in which an
unsophisticated or uneducated consumer is not likely to take advantage of the information that is provided for his use because he does not understand the technical
format of the information or does not understand how to use such information.
Jordan &: Warren, supra note 10, at 1303, 1306-07. A third case they suggest is the
"marginal" consumer, the consumer who must go heavily into debt in order to purchase items he considers necessary because he lacks liquid assets required for other
types of financing and is therefore less likely to avoid bad bargaining because the
amount saved by shopping for credit appears small beside the amount of his total
outstanding debt. Id. at 1321.
12. See, e.g., UCCC §§ 2-302, 3-302; CCPA §§ 128(b), 129(b), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1638(b),
1639(b) (Supp. V, 1965-1969).
MICH.
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principal purpose of the study on which this Article is based, therefore, was to test the hypothesis that consumers are insensitive to
interest rates.
Presumably, consumers in a perfect market will behave like water
in a pond, which gravitates to the lowest point-i.e., consumer
borrowers should all tum to the lender that gives the cheapest loan.13
We began this project with a strong suspicion-based on the observations of others14-that the consumer credit market is far from
perfect and that water governed by the force of gravity is a poor
metaphor with which to describe the behavior of consumer debtors.
The consumer debtor's choice of creditor clearly involves consideration of many factors besides interest rate. Therefore, a metaphor
that better describes our suspicions about the borrower's behavior
in a market in which rate differences appear involves a group of
monkeys in a cage with a new baboon of unknown temperament.
The baboon squats in one comer of the cage near some choice, ripe
bananas. In the far comer of the cage is a supply of wilted greens
and spoiled bananas, the monkeys' usual fare. Some of the monkeys
continue eating their usual fare because they are unaware of the
new bananas and the visitor. Other monkeys observe the new bananas
but do not approach them. Still others, more daring or intelligent
than the rest, seek ways of snatching an occasional banana from the
baboon's stock. The baboon strikes at all the brown monkeys but
he permits black monkeys to eat without interference. Yet many
of the black monkeys make no attempt to eat. One suspects that
a social scientist who interviewed the members of the monkey tribe
about their experience would find that many of those who saw and
appreciated the choice bananas would be unable to articulate the
reasons for their failure to eat any of them. The social scientist
might also discover that a few who looked at the baboon in obvious
fright would nevertheless deny that they were afraid. In addition,
he might find that some were so busy picking fleas or nursing that
they did not observe the choice bananas at all. We suspected that
consumer borrowers had similarly diverse reasons for their behavior.
We presumed that some paid high interest rates only because of
13. Such a hypothesis is discussed and modifications suggested by Jordan &: Warren,
supra note 10, and Kripke, Gesture and Reality in Consumer Credit Reform, 44 N.Y.U.
L. REY. I (1969). Modified versions of the perfect-market hypothesis, which proceeds
on the assumption that the consumer knows and uses loan cost in selecting his
creditor, are discussed and tested empirically in F. JUSTER&: R. SHAY, supra note 6.
14. E.g., F. JUSTER &: R. SHAY, supra note 6; Jordan &: Warren, supra note 10, at
1303-04.
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ignorance of lower rates and that others correctly concluded that
they could not qualify for a cheaper loan than they received.
Others, we suspected, were merely too lazy or too fearful of bankers
to seek lower rates.
To put the foregoing more precisely, our three major working
hypotheses were the following:
(1) Many of those borrowing at high rates of interest could
have procured the same loans in the same market at lower rates.
(2) Lack of knowledge that others offered loans at lower rates
was among the least significant of the barriers to acquiring a loan
at a lower rate.
(3) Debtors who sought loans at the lowest rate of interest
may be distinguished as a group on the basis of social, educational, and economic indicators from those who did not seek lowcost loans.
To test these hypotheses, we examined a sample of persons who had
obtained automobile loans in a money market in which there was
significant competition among lenders.

II. A

DESCRIPTION OF THE SURVEY

In the course of our survey, we interviewed a sample of persons
residing in Washtenaw County, Michigan, who borrowed money to
purchase new cars during the last 6 months of 1967.15 We chose loans
against automobiles partly because some data on the actual transactions were readily available in security agreements on file at the
county register of deeds office.16 For the typical auto loan, the institution lending the money takes a security interest in the car and
perfects that interest by filing a :financing statement with the local
register of deeds. The practice in Washtenaw County is for creditors
to file a copy of the actual security agreement as a financing statement. The security agreement sets forth the terms of the contract:
the down payment, the cash price, the time balance and finance
charge, the cost of insurance, the size of the monthly payment, the
loan terms, the rate of interest, and the car make and year. The
15. The questionnaire used is reprinted as Appendix A to this Article.
16. Under Michigan law, a creditor must file a financing statement in the county
of his debtor's residence in order to perfect a security interest in an :r.utomobile.
MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 19.9302(3)-(4), 19.9401 (1964); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 9.1858(2) (1968).
For a schedule of the information that we obtained from the security agreements, see
Appendix B infra.
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security agreement also discloses whether the car dealer signed the
loan contract. A second reason for choosing auto loans was that such
loans are among the largest a consumer ever seeks: it is likely that
auto loans involve the largest amounts--apart from a home mortgage loan-that a consumer undertakes to borrow in his lifetime.
Hence, if the rate of interest were ever to make a difference to a
consumer, it should be in this context, where a differential of one
or two percentage points in an add-on rate can amount to several
hundred dollars in interest cost.17 If the consumer will not seek the
lowest interest rates on a $3,000 loan, he is far less likely to shop for
a low rate on a loan of $100 or $200. In addition to these reasons,
some available empirical evidence suggests that persons borrowing
large amounts of money-on the order of $1,000 to $2,000-remember the interest rate on their loans with greater accuracy than do
those borrowing smaller amounts.18
Under Michigan law, the maximum interest rate that one may
charge on an installment loan made to finance the purchase of a new
car or a used car less than one year old is $6/100 "add-on."19 The
add-on charge may be computed with the following formula: Total
charge = H X I X Y. In the formula, H represents the number of
hundreds of dollars of principal, I represents the dollars per $100
interest, and Y represents the number of years of the loan. To illustrate, assume there is a $6/100 add-on charge on a $2,000 loan repayable in 36 monthly installments. The total charge will be 20 (the
number of hundreds of dollars of principal) times 6 (dollars per $100
interest) times 3 (the number of years)-i.e., 20 X 6 X 3 = $360. The
total of $2,360 is then divided by 36 (the number of months in 3
years) to derive the debtor's monthly installment payment of $65.56.
Here the $6/100 add-on interest is equivalent to an effective simple
annual interest rate of about 11.253.20
17. A new·car buyer seeking a $3,000 loan will pay 63 of $3,000, or $180 a year,
for the lifetime of the loan if he borrows at the rate of $6/100 add-on. (For a complete explanation of the meaning of "add-on," see text accompanying notes 19 &: 20
infra.) A new-car buyer with a $3,000 loan paying a rate of $4.50/100 add-on will pay
4.53 of $3,000, or $135 per year. Most new-car loans are made for a period of 3
years; thus the difference between the two rates means a difference in interest cost
of $135 (3 X $45) over the lifetime of the loan.
18. F. JUSTER &: R. SHAY, supra note 6, at 33-40. Juster and Shay found that in a
sample of 16,000 Consumer's Union members, accurate recall of interest rates increased with the size of the loan.
19. MICH. STAT. ANN. § 23.628(18) (1971).
20. Several methods of converting add-on rates to simple annual interest rates
were in common use prior to passage of the CCPA. The CCP A and the UCCC
adopted a uniform rule, known as the "actuarial" method, for conversion to simple
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During 1967, most of the lenders in Washtenaw County loaned
money for new cars at $6/100 add-on. Two of the largest lenders
were of particular interest: Ann Arbor Bank (AAB), the largest bank
in the county and the holder of the most automobile paper of any
bank in the county,21 and General Motors Acceptance Corporation
(GMAC), the :financing subsidiary of General Motors. We were
interested in GMAC because we were told that it would take greater
risks and lend to less solid debtors than would the banks.22 Both of
these lenders reputedly loaned to most new-car buyers at $6/100 addon. Also lending money in Washtenaw County was a smaller bank,
Huron Valley National Bank (HVNB), which loaned money at $4.50 /
100 in 1967 (8.53 simple interest on a 3-year loan). This bank, the
newest in Ann Arbor, started its operations in 1963 and was conducting a vigorous advertising campaign in 1967 in an effort to attract automobile loan customers. An illustration of the type of advertising used by HVNB is attached as Appendix C.
GMAC purchased its paper from dealers or received it through
dealer referrals, and AAB acquired most of its paper in the same way;
but HVNB wrote almost all of its own paper in the form of direct
loans. Because it loaned directly to the consumer, HVNB avoided
one usual lender's cost-the :finder fee or kickback commonly paid
to dealers who sell paper.23 We assumed that both banks and GMAC
were part of the market in auto loans because all did business in
Ann Arbor, the largest city in the county; nearly all of the residents
of the county live within a few minutes' drive of Ann Arbor. HVNB
has branches only in Ann Arbor; AAB has branches in Ann Arbor
and in one other city 8 miles away; and GMAC makes loans through
all General Motors dealers.
Using the Washtenaw County Register of Deeds records of :financing statements filed in the last 6 months of 1967, we drew samples
annual interest. The equivalent simple annual interest rates given in the text are
taken from the Annual Percentage Rate Tables published by the Federal Reserve
Board (see note 7 supra) and are those which would be required under the two acts.
See w. MoRS, CONSUMER CREDrr FrNANCE CHARGES: RATE INFORMATION AND QUOTATION
(1965); W. WILLIER & F. HART, CoNSUMER CREDIT HANDBOOK 163 (1969).
21. All the bank loan officers with whom we talked believed that Ann Arbor Bank
[hereinafter AAB] held the most automobile paper. We know of no public records
that confirm or refute their judgment.
22. Before beginning our survey, we talked with loan officers at several banks in
Ann Arbor to find out about local interest rates and kickbacks, as well as their views
of the market.
23. For a brief discussion of dealer-bank financing arrangements, see White, Repre·
senting the Low Income Consumer in Repossession, Resales and Deficiency Judgment
Cases, 64 Nw. U. L. REv. 808, 834 & n.92 (1970).
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for each of the 3 lenders.24 Personal interviews were conducted
during 1968, and most were completed by the end of that summer.
Altogether we interviewed 235 respondents, with a response rate of
663.25 Twenty-two per cent of the sample was never contacted by
an interviewer, and 123 refused to be interviewed. Our respondents
constitute a "stratified" sample, not statistically representative of all
persons borrowing to buy new cars in 1967 in the county, but representative of the buyers borrowing through HVNB, AAB, and
GMAC. Constructing the sample in this way allowed us to make
statistically valid comparisons between selected banks that, we
thought, were likely to lend to different types of customers. We think
the sample, taken as a whole, is also a fair cross-section of the newcar buyers in the county, and we believe it can be used for descriptive purposes as if it were representative.
24. The sampling procedure was complex and a trifle sloppy. The register of deeds
places financing statements in sequentially numbered files in the order of filing. By
going through the files for the last 6 months of 1967, we obtained lists of 1013 debtors
of AAB, 746 debtors of General Motors Acceptance Corporation [hereinafter GMAC],
and 381 debtors of Huron Valley National Bank [hereinafter HVNB]. The samples
drawn from these lists (1/6 samples from the AAB and GMAC lists and a 1/3 sample
from the HVNB list) did not make allowance for "trash"-financing statements that
covered security interests in merchandise other than new cars. After the trash was
removed, we drew a second sample from each of the lists so that the total number
of new-car buyers borrowing from each of the 3 creditors approximated the desired
sizes. The final sample from AAB numbered 134; that from GMAC, 117; that from
HVNB, 109. Theoretically, the second samples drawn from each of the lists violate
the rule of equiprobability sampling because each of these respondents had a slightly
greater chance of being included in the final combined sample. Although our procedure does not conform to the most desirable survey-sampling practice, it is unlikely
that the error has rendered the sample unrepresentative in any way.
25. The response rate is calculated by dividing the number of respondents who
consented to be interviewed by the total number of borrowers in our sample (after
we excluded any nonsample respondents). Nonsample respondents are persons who,
contrary to the information available from the financing statement, in fact were not
financing through one of the banks in which we were interested or who were not
financing new cars. Two respondents who refused to complete an interview that had
been begun arc counted as having been interviewed for the purposes of calculating
the response rate.
FINAL STATUS OF SURVEY SAMPLE

Interviews
Refusals
Never Contacted
Total•

GMAC

AAB

HVNB

69 ( 59.03)
23 ( 19.73)
25 ( 21.43)

103 ( 77.03)
IO ( 7.43)
21 ( 16.03)

64( 59.03)
11 ( 10.13)
34( 31.23)

236 (65.53)
44 (12.23)
80 (22.23)

117 (100.13)

134 (100.43)

109 (100.33)

360 (99.93)

Total

• Because percentage figures have been rounded off, the printed figures do not necessarily total 100.03.
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III. MOST RESPONDENTS WHO BORROWED AT THE
MAXIMUM LEGAL RATE COULD HAVE BORROWED
AT A LOWER RATE
If the new-car loan market in Washtenaw County were a perfect
market in which lenders were distributed by reference to a single
variable-money cost-then one would expect the high-priced lenders to serve the high-risk debtors and the low-priced lenders to serve
the low-risk debtors. In 1967 there was significant rate competition
in the new-car loan market. HVNB made all but an insignificant
number of its loans at $4.50/100, while GMAC and AAB made all
but a small number of their loans at $6/100, a rate Vs higher than
HVNB's rate. The magnitude of this rate difference is illustrated
by the corresponding $135 difference in the cost of a $3,000 loan
over 3 years. 2 6
To test the hypothesis that many borrowers who were low risks
and would have qualified for the $4.50/100 rate had in fact borrowed
at the $6/100 rate, we asked the HVNB loan officer who actually
made the final decision on HVNB loans in 1967 to pass on 48
hypothetical loan applicants. 27 Among these 48 were the cases of 38
persons whom we had interviewed and who had in fact borrowed
from AAB (18 cases) or from GMAC (20 cases) in 1967. Six were
persons who had actually borrowed from HVNB in 1967 and 4 were
fictitious cases.
In each of the AAB- or GMAC-borrower cases presented to the
HVNB loan officer, we knew, on the basis of the interview or the
security agreement that had been filed, the debtor's income, job
history, general financial status, the kind of car that he had purchased in 1967, and the terms of the loan that he had procured at
that time. We could not present the debtor in the flesh for a personal
interview with the loan officer, nor could we provide a reference from
a current creditor of the debtor.28 However, we were able to give the
loan officer all the other data that he would normally use to decide
26. See note 17 supra.
27. Out of consideration for the loan officer's schedule, we set an arbitrary maximum
of 50 on the number of cases presented to him. We first selected every tenth AAB
interview (in order of completion) and every fifth GMAC interview. That process produced 10 of each, or samples of about 103 and 153, respectively. After making a
decision to double this number, we selected every tenth-plus-one AAB interview and
every fifth-plus-one GMAC interview. The procedure was, for our purposes, satisfactory to give us a representative subsample of interviews from the 2 banks.
28. A "routine check" of credit references at HVNB meant telephoning 1 or 2
current or recent creditors (preferably creditors from the immediate area) to obtain
information about the loan applicant's payment history.
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whether to loan and on what terms to make a loan.29 It will come as
no surprise that the debtor's disposable income and his job stability
were the two most important considerations for the loan offi.cer.30
Other relevant factors he normally considers were as diverse as
whether the debtor had had a recent divorce,31 his general appearance,32 his education, and the type of car that he wished to purchase.33
29. The terms of each debtor's actual loan were available to us from the security
agreements that the creditor filed with the register of deeds and from which we
initially obtained the respondent's name. For each hypothetical case, the HVNB loan
officer indicated the amount and type of loan that he would have made in 1967 to
the persons we described. To the best of his ability under the circumstances, he also
indicated what factors were important in making each decision. Since the loan officer
had no opportunity to interview any debtor and since he had to put himself in the
frame of mind that he had in 1967 in a different credit market, his judgment about
what he would have done in 1967 is probably not entirely accurate. Furthermore, he
stipulated that he was proceeding on the assumption that the debtor could produce
credit references to verify some of the information. Despite these difficulties, the loan
officer believed he was able to approximate closely what he would have done with
each of the loan applications in 1967.
30. The factors that influence the loan-making decisions of AAB and GMAC are
probably the same as those that influence HVNB. Both AAB and GMAC do a high·
volume business in car loans and lend on the basis of information telephoned to them
by dealers-nearly all of GMAC's and more than % of AAB's new-car loan business
is conducted in this manner. On the other hand, HVNB considers itself a more cautious, low-volume lender in the new-car loan market and interviews all of its potential
debtors. Nevertheless, differences, if any, in the types of customers to whom the 2 banks
and GMAC lend are almost certainly the result of the lenders' respective decisions
to take more or fewer risks rather than the result of different weights attributed to
particular characteristics of buyers.
31. A recent divorce indicates the possibility of liability for alimony or child-support
payments or of more general financial difficulty, from which, in the opinion of the
loan officer, divorces frequently stem.
32. In the course of drafting this section, the following exchange of footnotes took
place:
(White's proposed footnote) When the loan officer described neat personal ap·
pearance as a desirable debtor attribute, one of your authors, whose appearance
that day could most charitably be described as slovenly, went into an uncontrol·
!able fit of petting and grooming his mane.
(Munger's substitution) Your other author is a member of the Air National
Guard and under its vigilant eye has never let more than a quarter-inch of hair
show at one time. We understand his caution has been rewarded by several favor·
able loans!
In any event, while the potential impact of appearance and other such subtle factors
on chances for obtaining a loan seem important, we were unable to measure them
adequately. Our conclusions therefore should be considered in light of the effect such
factors could have on an actual loan application. See note 69 infra.
33. The loan officer expressed the following reasons for considering the type of
car a borrower wanted to purchase. The typical car buyer should be looking for a
car that fits his budget and that will be serviceable for some time. The more practical
the choice of car appears to be, the more certain the loan officer can be of the person's
potential reliability in making future payments. Conversely, a car that is flashy, fad·
dish, or generally too large for the customer's budget may indicate temporary
enthusiasm, may foretell future loss of interest in paying for a status symbol, and
may warn that the buyer will default shortly before leaving town. The loan officer
said that when making loans for luxury cars or for sports cars, he often required as
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Each of these last-mentioned factors took a back seat in the loan
officer's mind to income, job security, and at least one credit reference.
Having put himself in his 1967 frame of mind, the HVNB loan
officer gave us his best estimate of the maximum amount he would
have loaned in 1967 to each of our 48 potential borrowers. A most
interesting finding is that he would have loaned money to 36 of the
38 persons who procured loans at GMAC and AAB; he found only
2 of them to be totally unworthy of credit (see Table l). Of course,
the fact that he would have loaned some money to each of the other
36 does not mean that each of them could have procured a satisfactory loan from HVNB, for in some cases he would have required a
much higher down payment than that required by the higher-priced
lenders; it is probable that some of these borrowers did not have the
resources to come up with additional down-payment money. However, as Table I discloses, HVNB would have made at least the same
loan as the higher-priced lenders made or would have required less
than $100 additional down payment in 453 of the GMAC cases and
in 393 of the AAB cases.34 These results indicate that if all or nearly
all of them could have come up with an additional $100 down payment, more than 423 of the AAB and GMAC customers could have
procured a nearly identical loan at HVNB at a rate % lower than
the one they were paying. If GMAC and AAB borrowers could have
come up with an additional $250 down payment, then more than
603 of them could have qualified for a $4.50/100 loan at HVNB.
Whether the HVNB loan officer in fact would have made the
loans on the terms that he described, we have no way of knowmuch as ~ of the price down, whereas the normal minimum down payment was
about 203 of the price. Apparently because of such caution there had been only 6
to 8 repossessions on 6000 outstanding loans during the 6 months preceding the
interview.
34. In the remainder of this Article, we concern ourselves primarily with trying
to explain why persons who could have borrowed at HVNB did not do so. We assume
that a person first decides what kind of car he wants and then looks for a loan. Someone wishing to purchase an expensive car in 1967 on a moderate or small income
was required to pay a large down payment in order to obtain a loan through HVNB
(see note 33 supra). We were told by some respondents and by bank loan officers with
whom we spoke before conducting our survey that GMAC offered "easy credit,'' that
is, that GMAC accepted low down payments on expensive cars even if the borrower's
income was moderate. If this is true, a borrower buying a large car on a small income
and wishing to make a normal or small down payment is effectively limited in the
number of lenders to which he may turn. Our data show that more than 503 of the
cars financed by GMAC in Washtenaw County in 1967 cost over $3,000 and that
fewer than 503 of the cars financed by AAB and HVNB cost $3,000 or more. In addi-

TABLE 1
TABULATION OF ACTUAL AND HYPOTHETICAL AVERAGE LOANS FOR 38 CASES PRESENTED TO CREDIT MANAGERS

1967 GMAC
Borrowers
1967 AAB
Borrowers

0

303 (6)

453 (9)

603 (12)

2

333 (6)

393 (7)

643 (12)

1967 Average
Actual
Down Payment

20

$569.39

$741.00

18

$606.62

$615.68

Total

N)

Percentage
HVNB Down
Payment Less

HVNB Down
Payment•
Less or
within
$250

Number
Rejected in
1970 by
HVNB

,.......,

.....
.....
c.o

HVNB Down
Payment•
Less or
within
$100

1970 Average
HVNB
Hypothetical
Down Payment

• Includes preceding column.
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ing.35 The debtors might have been a wholly unpersuasive lot, who
lacked reliable credit references. On the other hand, they might
have persuaded him to lend even more money than he told us he
would have loaned. Most important, our data show that the AAB
and GMAC borrowers had no greater liabilities and no less income
tion, the average difference between the down payments actually made by GMAC
borrowers and those that HVNB would have required in 1967 on cars priced over
$3,000 was substantially greater than the average difference between AAB down
payments and those that HVNB would have required in 1967.
COMPARISON OF DOWN PAYMENT.! MADE TO GMAC AND AAB
ON CARs PRICED $3000 OR MoRE WITH HVNB
HYPOTHETICAL DoWN PAYMENTS
Average
Actual
Down Payment

Average HVNB No. of Loans on
Hypothetical Which HVNB Down
Down Payment Payment Smaller

N

GMAC
Borrowers

$456.16

$849.50

1

12

$885.25

$1028.25

2

4

AAB
Borrowers

Similarly, among all our respondents the average down payment made by HVNB
borrowers on all new cars was 29.73 of the purchase price, the average down payment to AAB was 22.03 of the purchase price, and the average down payment to
GMAC was 18.03 of the purchase price (see Item 5b in Appendix B). Finally, a disproportionate number of lower-income GMAC borrowers in our sample (under $10,000
total family income) were financing cars priced at $3,000 or more. Fourteen of the
18 GMAC borrowers-about 783-with incomes under $10,000 bought cars priced
over $3,000. Thirty per cent of the 47 low-income AAB borrowers bought cars costing
at least $3,000. And 423 of the 29 low-income HVNB borrowers bought cars priced
at $3,000 or more.
What we conclude from these figures is that new-car buyers with smaller incomes
who have decided to buy an expensive car gravitate to a lender with a reputation for
easy credit. (When asked why they borrowed from GMAC, several of our respondents
gave precisely this reason; see Questions III B-2 and IV B in Appendix A.) Many of
these probably would have been refused the same loan at HVNB. Moreover, a buyer
who is willing go deep into debt for the sake of a grossly uneconomical purchase
may also be quite willing to take the most convenient loan rather than worry about a
few extra dollars interest.
35. As a check on the accuracy of the HVNB loan officer's judgment and on the
importance of the information that we were not able to give him, we included 6
borrowers from our sample who had borrowed from HVNB through this loan officer
in 1967 and compared his 1970 decisions with the terms of the actual 1967 loans. As
an additional check, we included 4 fictitious and exceptionally risky cases to help us
judge whether or not the loan officer unrealistically lowered the bank's standards.
The results of these checking procedures show that the minimum down payment
the loan officer would require in 1970 on the basis of the information we gave him
was somewhat lower than that actually paid by 4 out of the 6 persons who had
actually borrowed from HVNB in 1967. The following table summarizes the data on
which we base our assessment of the accuracy of the HVNB loan officer's estimates.

(Footnote continued on next page)
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or assets than did the HVNB borrowers.36 Apart from the fact that
each of the 38 borrowers in our hypothetical sample who dealt with
COMPARISON OF LOANS ACTUALLY MADE BY HVNB AND :MAXIMUM LOANS
OFFERED BY HVNB LoAN OFFICER THREE YEARS LATER

Price

Actual 1967
Time Balance

$3000
3200
2990
2859
2500
4387

$2287
2017
1767
2959
2193
4284

Actual
Down Payment
(3 of Price)

$ 900
1450
1457
294
1181
487

Average
$2584.5
Average Over-all HVNB:

Hypothetical
Maximum
Loan

(30.03)
(45.13)
(48.63)
(10.33)
(47.33)
(11.13)

$2481
2725
2837
2497
2837
3488

(32.13)
(29.73)

$2811

Hypothetical
Minimum
Down Payment
(3 of Price)
$ 700
700
490
659
581
1187

(23.43)
(21.83)
(16.43)
(22.13)
(23.13)
(27.13)
(22.33)

The loan officer would not accept any of the fictitious borrowers-who were all very bad
risks. One of the 2 loans that he made in 1967 but said he would not make for the
same amount when we presented him with the same information in 1970 was a loan
to a self-employed businessman for an expensive car. The loan officer said that this is
one of the "problem" situations that he handles very cautiously. Had he known that
the individual had a reputation for sound credit or had he checked credit references,
he probably would have been willing to offer this individual as much as he did in
1967. Our inability to provide the loan officer with credit references and with the
identity of the borrower, a local merchant, changed the outcome. Furthermore, the loan
officer's tendency in 1970 to offer smaller down payments than were actually required
in 1967 is consistent with the fact that borrowers frequently wish to borrow less than
the maximum the bank is willing to lend and that we had asked the officer to estimate
the maximum amount he would lend. In any event, only in exceptional cases was the
loan officer v.illing to allow a borrower to put down less than 20-253 of the price-a
percentage that the loan officer said the bank requires for low- and middle-priced
cars-or 303 of the price-the amount the bank regularly requires for high-priced
cars. Although we could check his accuracy only very generally, we conclude that the
loan officer's standards were not unrealistically low; despite the absence of information
-e.g., credit references-he gave us a reasonably accurate picture of what the bank
would have been willing to lend had the real borrowers asked for loans in 1967.
INCOME OF REsPONDENTS
(In Thousands of Dollars)

36.
0-5
GMAC
AAB
HVNB

4.83
5.23
4.93
Median

Total•

N

41.43
19.03
27.03
4.83
3.23
100.23
22.83
18.73
18.73
23.93
lo.43
97.73
13.13
23.03
11.53
31.23
100.13
16.43
for GMAC, AAB, HVNB, and Total = $10-12,500

63
96
61

5-7.5

7.5-10

10-12.5

12.5-20

20+

• Because percentage figures have been rounded off, printed figures do not necessarily total 100.03.
It should be noted that our sample does not include consumers with marginal
incomes. By selecting only new-car loans we have doubtless excluded the ghetto
dweller and the abject poor.
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AAB or GMAC agreed to pay the maximum rate possible, we know
nothing about them that suggests that they represented greater risks
or that they were for any other reason less attractive borrowers.
Some may argue that we dwell too long on an obvious truthnamely, that the consumer market is horribly imperfect. We reject
that argument. We believe it significant that a large minority and
perhaps a majority of those who borrowed from the most expensive
and least conservative creditor in the market could have had the
same or nearly the same loan with the most conservative and least
expensive creditor. Is it not remarkable that a majority of the newcar buyers may have been paying 253 more interest than they had to
pay? Certainly the bank loan officers most familiar with the market,
with whom we spoke before we conducted the survey, painted a
picture of the market-one in which high-risk customers were concentrated at GMAC and similar institutions-quite different from
the one that we discovered. We also suspect that some of the proponents of disclosure legislation would not have thought the market
to be as insensitive to price differences as it proved to be. An equally
intriguing and more elusive question to which we now turn is why
those apparently able to borrow at a significantly lower rate failed
to do so.
IV.

LACK OF KNOWLEDGE THAT OTHERS OFFER A LOWER

RATE WAS NoT THE PRINCIPAL DETERRENT FOR MOST
PERSONS WHO

FAILED

To BORROW AT THE LOWER RATE

A variety of facts suggests that the rate of interest charged on his
loan is not an important fact in the eyes of the typical automobile
buyer. First, our data confirm findings made elsewhere that consumers are ignorant of rates (see Table 2).37 A majority of our
sample-an overwhelming majority if one excludes the respondents
who borrowed at HVNB-were ignorant of the interest rate that
they were paying on their auto loans. When one combines this
ignorance of rates with the fact that all of the persons interviewed
had contracted for their loans within the year previous to the interview and were still making payments on those loans, he is at least
nudged toward the conclusion that the interest rate was not uppermost in the borrowers' minds at the time the loans were arranged.
37. See, e.g., F. JuSTER &: R. SHAY, supra note 6; Due, supra note 6; Hoskins, .supra
note 6.

June 1971]

Consumer Sensitivity to Interest Rates

1223

TABLE 2
Knew Exact
Add-On Rate

•Knew Add-On
Rate within
.53

Did Not Know
Add-On Rate
within .53

AAB
GMAC

51.03
20.43
28.03

63.53
34.83
45.53

36.53
65.23
54.53

100.03 (63)
100.03 (103)
100.03 (68)

Totalt

27.83

43.13

56.93

100.03 (202)

HVNB

• Includes Column A.
t Weighted by Lender (see note 24).

A second fact consistent with the hypothesis that interest rate
is comparatively unimportant to the credit buyer is the willingness
of most respondents to allow the automobile dealer to arrange the
loan rather than to shop for the lowest available rate. Altogether
65.53 of our respondents and approximately 75.53 of all the
borrowers at GMAC, AAB, and HVNB allowed the dealer to arrange
the loan.38 While our sample is statistically representative of the
borrowers of only 3 lenders in the county, the fact that most other
large lenders in the area made loans through dealers at $6/100 add-on
in 1967 leads us to the conclusion that at least 75.53 of all the newcar loans in the Washtenaw County market are made through the
dealer at or near the maximum rate permissible by law.39
Among our respondents who allowed the dealer to arrange the
loan, only 113 (14) made any prior inquiry elsewhere about loans.
If the dealer at the point of contracting had said that the loan would
be made at $7 /100 or even $8/100, is it plausible that these people
would have gone elsewhere to borrow? There is certainly no evidence
from our respondents to indicate that they would have done so.
Also militating in favor of discounting interest rate as an important factor-at least among those who accepted the loan offered by
the lender-are the reasons given by respondents for allowing the
38. The reason for the difference between the 2 figures is the double proportion of
HVNB borrowers in our sample (see note 24 supra). The 75.53 figure is corrected to
represent the true proportion of the borrowers of the 3 lenders.
39. The loan officer at AAB stated that every car dealer in the county had some
form of referral arrangement with at least I lender. He and the HVNB officials agreed
that HVNB was one of the few exceptions to the general rule of "indirect" lending.
A letter that a local auto-dealers association sent to HVNB's president shortly after
that bank opened discloses how exceptional the HVNB policy is. That letter characterized HVNB's direct-loan policy as shortsighted; it offered HVNB "membership" in
the local combination in restraint of trade and forecast economic disaster for a bank
that did not buy paper from dealers.
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dealer to arrange the loan (see Figure I). The largest number of
respondents said that they agreed to the loan arranged by the dealer
because they had had previous experience with the creditor, AAB or
GMAC. The second most frequent response was that of "convenience." Well down the list of reasons was low cost. Conceivably,
some of those people would have gone elsewhere had they known
they were not getting a cheap loan; but we are skeptical. The propensity to deal again with a familiar creditor and the emphasis on
the convenience of allowing the dealer to arrange the loan may be
taken at face value as an indication of laziness or lack of interest in
competing offers or as a sign of debtor insecurity about dealing with
unfamiliar creditors.
Fourth, there is an understandably high coincidence between
the place where a borrower lived and the place where he borrowed
(see Table 3). All 3 creditors have branches or dealer representatives
in the city of Ann Arbor. HVNB, however, has branches only in Ann
Arbor, andAAB has only 1 branch outside Ann Arbor. GMAC, on the
other hand, makes loans through all General Motors dealers in the
county. Ypsilanti, the second largest city in the county, is located
about 4 miles from Ann Arbor (in the opposite direction from AAB's
out-county branch) and does not have branch offices of either bank
we studied. Over 803 of HVNB's borrowers lived in Ann Arbor,
the location of all of its branches. Nearly the same percentage of
TABLE 3
(N = 235)
RE.sl'ONDENIS' PLACE OF REsIDENCE

HVNB
AAB
GMAC

Ann Arbor

Ypsilanti

Dexter

Other

81.33
66.03
25.03

4.73
8.73
47.13

1.63
12.63
1.53

12.53
11.73
26.43

100.13
99.03
100.03

• Because percentage figures have been rounded off, the printed figures do not
necessarily total I00.03.

AAB's customers lived in Ann Arbor and Dexter, the cities in which
all of AAB's branches are located. In contrast, approximately 753
of GMAC's business came from outside Ann Arbor or Dexter. The
conclusion one draws from these data, of course, is that geographical
location and the convenience associated with geographical proximity
is an important factor in a borrower's decision about where to borrow.
A final piece of evidence-indeed, the only direct evidence-that
supports the conclusion that lack of knowledge was not the principal

FIGURE I
REAsONS GIVEN FOR BORROWING THROUGH AN AUTO DEALER•

-

AAB

~
N=64

GMAC

Average

N=66

D
N=130

Always borrow
this way

"In a hurry,"
''Convenience"

Cheaper to
borrow through
dealer

Took
dealer's
advice

Low credit
rating

Did inquire

elsewhere

Don't know

• HVNB is not included because only 2 of our 64 HVNB respondents had dealermade loans. Approximately 973 of all GMAC loans and about 623 of all AAB loans
were arranged through the dealer.
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deterrent to comparative shopping by debtors is our finding that
approximately 293 of GMAC and AAB respondents knew of at
least I lender in the county that loaned at a rate lower than the one
they were paying. Some of these persons mentioned institutions from
which they could not have borrowed-for example, the University
of Michigan Employees' Credit Union-but most of them named
lending institutions that loaned money to the general public. As our
discussion in part V will show, this group of people who had the knowledge but did not use it is by no means a group of unusually bad
credit risks; nor were these debtors prevented from taking advantage of the lower rate by any financial disadvantage that we could
discover.
We asked the 293 who knew about a lower rate of interest but
did not take advantage of it this question: "Why didn't you borrow
from the creditor offering the lower rate?" Their answers were consistent with the theory that interest rate is outweighed by other considerations in the minds of those buyers who know a lower rate and
can weigh that knowledge against other factors (Figure 2). Some of
these respondents were like the monkeys: 40 they admitted fear of
dealing with the new creditor who might have rejected them or
required anxiety-producing credit-checking procedures. By way of
justification, they emphasized strength of established ties to a familiar or more convenient creditor.
We are particularly suspicious of the "convenience" responses,
the largest single category (443).41 We suspect that some, and perhaps many, of the respondents used "convenience" as a euphemism
for "The dealer is friendly, but I'm threatened by those stuffy
bankers." Others may have used "convenience" as a graceful admission of surrender to dealer pressure.42
40. See text following note 13 supra.
41. Not only in our study but also in others, "convenience" responses predominate
among explanations given by borrowers for using installment credit offered by the
seller instead of bank credit. See OPINION REsEARCH CoRP., supra note 6.
42. For the report of an undercover agent who sold cars for a short time, which
describes the unscrupulous but effective pressures that a car dealer may apply to nail
down a deal, see Rapoport, How I Made $193.85 Selling Cars, ATLANTIC MONTHLY,
Jan. 1970, at 75. See also Shannon, The Baffling Facts About Shopping for a New
Model Car in Detroit, Detroit Free Press, Jan. 25, 1970, § B, at I, col. I.
Others have interpreted the "convenience" response and other data to mean that
competition lies in areas other than interest rate. They also conclude that the market
tends to divide on the basis of risks that creditors are willing to take instead of on
the basis of rates. See Harper, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code: A Critical
.&nalysis, 44 N.Y.U. L. R.Ev. 53, 67-68 (1969). Our own data tend to confirm this interpretation of convenience responses, but our data do not show that there are significant
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FIGURE 2
REAsONS 'WHY THOSE 'WHO KNEW OF A LOWER-COST LENDER
DID NoT SEEK A LOWER-COST LOAN

(N =59)

Convenience;
crooitor is my
regular bank

Legitimate
impossibility

15.33

:Believe lender is
tougher: larger
down ·payment, more 1-----.
credit references;"
i 3·63
too much trouble to
join credit union

Dealer
pressure

5.13

Fear of being
refused

5.13

Did not believe
low rate

Have been refused
there before

Don't know;
Other

·1.73

____

_, 15.33

If it were somehow possible to provide money-cost information
to all prospective new-car buyers before they arranged a purchase and
loan, what would be the result? Nothing in our data indicates that
such knowledge would have significantly changed the behavior of
our respondents, and much in our data suggests that such knowledge
differences in the risks presented by the borrowers to the 3 creditors we studied in
terms of income and assets held. We have shown that the lowest-rate lender would
have offered the same loans to most of the customers of the other 2.
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would not have altered their behavior. The majority of the borrowers in our sample were ignorant of the interest rate they were
actually paying.43 All but a small minority bought credit with the
car and did not shop.44 Most borrowed near home45 and stated reasons quite unrelated to rates as a basis for their borrowing behavior.46
Finally, and most disheartening, is the substantial minority who
actually knew of an institution lending at lower rates than they enjoyed but who did not stir themselves to borrow at the lower rate.47
One is reminded of the statement attributed to a cigarette company
executive on the cigarette cancer warning: "I think the American
public is too intelligent to pay any attention to that type of warning."
The classic rejoinder also fits: "In the long run the people can be
counted on."

v.

How DID BORROWERS WHO WERE SENSITIVE TO INTEREST
RATE DIFFERENCES CONTRAST WITH
BORROWERS WHo WERE NoT?

We began this study by seeking to determine whether a substantial number of persons who had borrowed to finance the purchase of
new cars could have obtained loans at interest rates lower than the
ones that they were paying. Our interview with the loan officer at
HVNB showed that a substantial proportion of those who had borrowed from the other lenders could have obtained a lower-cost loan.
Our second step consisted of looking at new-car buyers in our sample
to see how many retained rate information. We found many who
had information about low-cost loans but who did not seek loans at
the lower rate. We tried to determine why these buyers did not shop
for loans at the lower rate. The data presented above suggest that
a variety of psychological, geographical, and economic factors governs
the behavior of borrowers in the consumer loan market. On the basis
of those factors, we will now attempt to distinguish the borrower who
shops for the low-cost loan from his nonshopping counterpart.
Most new-car buyers borrowing at the legal maximum rate had
no knowledge of interest rates offered by lenders other than their
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

See
See
See
See
See

Table 2 supra.
note 38 supra and accompanying text.
Table 3 supra.
Figure I supra.
text preceding note 40 supra and Figure 2 supra.
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own.48 Borrowers who were uninformed about competing lenders
and who were unconcerned with interest rates or competition among
lenders we will hereafter describe as "uninformed nonshoppers." 49
A small proportion (17.43) of the new-car buyers we interviewed
did know that interest rates varied and selected a lender on that
basis. These buyers may be called "shoppers." 50 And a third group
of respondents (29.03), whom we have already discussed, 51 knew
that at least one other lender in the county loaned money at a rate
lower than the one that they were paying. They constitute a group of
"informed nonshoppers." 02 We may begin by examining the differences among these three groups. The differences may help us explain
why some new-car buyers shop for loans, why some explicitly ignore
an opportunity to obtain a loan at a lower rate, and why most seem
completely unaware of interest rate differences.
If one lets his imagination run, he can come up with a variety of
hypothetical characteristics with which to identify those who shop
and those who do not. A most obvious hypothesis is that the shoppers
are more financially sophisticated than are the nonshoppers. We
attempted to test this first hypothesis both by direct questioning and
by asking each debtor about the type of assets that he owned; we
assumed that debtors who dealt in stocks and bonds and who had
several bank accounts would be more accustomed to thinking of
money as a commodity to be purchased and sold. As our second
hypothesis, we assumed that debtors with large incomes would be
48. See Appendix A infra, question II J.
49. The group that we will refer to as "uninformed nonshoppers" allowed the
dealer to arrange their loan (Question II B in Appendix A), did not inquire elsewhere
about the possibility of a loan (Question II B-4 in Appendix A), did not inquire about
the possibility of a different loan even if they had borrowed from another creditor at
another time (Questions II B-4 and II C-1 in Appendix A), did not switch creditors
since the last car purchase for reasons related to the cost of the loan (Question III B
in Appendix A), and did not patronize their current creditors because they offered
cheap loans (Question IV C in Appendix A).
50. The group that we will call "shoppers" includes those who borrowed where
they did because the creditor offered cheaper loans (Questions II D-1 and IV B in
Appendix A), who either switched to or stayed with a prior creditor because he
offered a cheaper loan (Questions m B and C in Appendix A), and who were paying
less than $6/100 add-on on their loan (taken from the financing statement-see Appendix B).
51. See text preceding note 40 supra and Figure 2 supra.
52. The group that will be referred to in subsequent tables and text as the "informed nonshoppers" was assembled by sorting out all respondents who said that
they had heard of a lender who would lend at a rate of interest lower than the one
that they were paying (Question II J in Appendix A), who was geographically within
their reach, and who did not loan only to special groups-e.g., an employee credit
union for which the respondent was ineligible (Question II J-4 in Appendix A).
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more likely to shop for a low rate than would debtors with smaller
incomes. A third hypothesis that we sought to test in our questioning
was that the character of a debtor's job may be related to his propensity to shop--that is, a white-collar worker might be more likely
to shop than a blue-collar one. Fourth, we sought to ascertain
whether those debtors who shopped could be characterized as bettereducated than those who did not.
A

Financial Sophistication

In order to obtain evidence of financial sophistication, and at
the same time directly to test our respondents' propensity to shop for
a low-cost loan, we asked the question: "If you were to pay $6 per
100 on a loan, would you expect it to cost the same as interest at
63?"53 Most of the shoppers (63.43) correctly answered "No";
46.03 of the informed nonshoppers gave the correct answer; and
only 21.63 of the uninformed nonshoppers knew the proper response.54
We also reasoned that those respondents who owned stocks and
bonds would be more sophisticated financially than those who did
not, since ownership of such assets indicates experience in treating
money as a commodity. Accordingly, we expected shoppers to be
more likely than either group of nonshoppers to hold stocks and
bonds (see Table 4). While 46.03 of the shoppers and 42.03 of the
informed nonshoppers held such assets at the time they purchased
their last new car, less than~ (22.83) of the uninformed nonshoppers owned stocks and bonds at the time of purchase. A larger proportion of uninformed nonshoppers than of either other group held
no substantial assets for investment.
53. See Question II I-2 in Appendix A.
54.
ANSWERS TO THE QUESTION "IF You WERE To PAY $6 PER 100 ON A
LOAN, WOULD You ExPEcr IT To COST THE SAME AS INTEREST AT 63?"
Costs
The Same

Costs Are
Different

Don't
Know

Total•

N

Shoppers
Informed
Nonshoppers

17.13

63.43

19.43

99.93

41

28.63

46.03

25.43

100.03

50

Uninformed
Nonshoppers

39.23

21.63

39.23

100.03

66

• Because percentage figures have been rounded off, the printed figures do not
necessarily total 100.03.
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TABLE 4
AssETs

HELD FOR INVESTMENT

AT TIME OF

Amo PURCHASE

Per cent who Per cent who
held stocks/ held real estate• Per cent who
bonds
or other
held no assets

Totalt

N

Shoppers

46.03

4.93

49.83

100.73

41

Informed
Nonshoppers

42.03

10.03

48.03

100.03

50

Uninformed
Nonshoppers

22.83

19.73

57.53

100.03

66

Total
Nonshoppers

31.03

15.53

53.53

100.03

116

X2 (rows 1 and 2)
X2 (rows 1 and 3)

< I, not significant.55
= 8.74, p < .02.

• Does not include respondent's home.
Because percentage figures have been rounded off, the printed figures do not
necessarily total 100.03.

t

Among the uninformed nonshoppers, the percentage that had
real-estate holdings nearly equalled the percentage that invested in
stocks and bonds. In contrast, a similar comparison for both shoppers
and informed nonshoppers reveals that far more of the respondents
in these groups invested in stocks and bonds than in real estate or
other assets. Thus, it appears that shoppers were more financially
sophisticated than at least uninformed nonshoppers in terms of
understanding interest rates and of kinds of investments.

B. Income and Home Ownership
Arguably, the higher a borrower's income, the more likely he is
to have alternatives to borrowing at an add-on rate and to be interested in finding the add-on loan that compares most favorably to a
loan at simple interest.56 Prior studies have contended that consumers will absorb information when it is economically rational to
do so and that consumers with a level of income high enough to give
55. Chi-square statistics have been computed for each of the tables in this section.
The level of significance for a X2 value, for example p
.05, may be interpreted as
meaning that the numbers are so unevenly distributed in the table that such a distribution would occur less than 53 of the time by chance. For a significance level of
p .20, the distribution in the table would be obtained less than 1 in 5 times by
chance. These statistics should be used as an aid to intention. They do not indicate
what caused the distribution of numbers in the table or how strong the relationship
between two variables may be if a relationship exists. The actual numbers are included
with some reluctance, but they may be valuable when differences in percentages alone
axe themselves misleading or inconclusive.
56. F. JusrER &: R. SHAY, supra note 6, at 1-18.

<

<
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them alternatives will remember interest rates and shop for low-cost
loans. 57
If these arguments are correct, shoppers should have higher average incomes than nonshoppers. However, Table 5 shows that, while
a slightly higher proportion of shoppers than nonshoppers had incomes above $15,000, a greater proportion also had incomes below
$10,000. The mean income of both shoppers and nonshoppers fell
between $10,000 and $12,499. Except for the te:µdency for shoppers
to be concentrated at the extremes of the income distribution, a
borrower's income does not appear to be related to his interest-rate
sensitivity. A possible explanation for this failure of the statistics to
bear out the theories of prior studies is that the incomes of the respondents in our sample were higher and showed much less variation
than the incomes of the population of Washtenaw County as a
whole. 58 Thus, by inadvertently limiting our study to an unusually
high-income sample, we may have obscured some significant relationships. A second possible explanation for the apparent lack of relationship between one's income level and his propensity to shop is
that income makes little difference until a certain level is reached;
beyond that level, consumers pay more attention to interest rates.
TABLE 5
INCOME
$0-7,499

$7,5009,999

$10,00014,999

$15,000+

N.A.•

Total

N

14.73

31.73

19.53

29.23

4.93

100.03

41

Shoppers
Informed
Nonshoppers

11.03

16.03

46.03

22.03

2.03

100.03

50

Uninformed
Nonshoppers

18.23

25.83

28.83

24.23

3.03

100.03

66

Total
Nonshoppers

16.43

22.63

36.23

23.23

2.63

100.03 116

<

X2 (rows 1 and 2) = 7.59, p
.1.
x2 (rows 1 and 3)
2.5, not significant.

<

• Not available.
57. This theory also suggests that borrowers who do not shop for low-cost loans do
shop for monthly payment sizes that fit their budgets. For these borrowers, the savings
on interest is not as important as the drain on assets caused by monthly payments.
F. JUSTER &: R. SHAY, supra note 6, at 1-18.
58. The median income in Washtenaw County was $6,890 in 1967, and 23.93 of the
families in the county had incomes over $10,000. U.S. BUR. OF nm CENsus, COUNTY &:
CITY DATA BoOK 1967, A STATISTICAL ABsTRAcr SUPPLEMENT 183 (1967). Over half of the
respondents in the survey reported incomes over $10,000. See note 36 supra.
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But this theory does not help to explain the behavior of those whose
income is below that threshold level; that is, it does not explain why
some low- and moderate-income respondents shopped while others
did not.
Surprisingly, we found that about twice as many nonshoppers as
shoppers owned their homes outright-that is, were no longer subject to liability for mortgage or rent payments (Table 6). A possible
explanation for this finding is that people who have mortgages are
more aware of money as a commodity. Also, because a home mortTABLE 6
OWNERSHIP

HOME

Per cent
who Own

Per cent
who Mortgage

Per cent
who Rent

Total

N

Shoppers
Informed
Nonshoppers

12.23

61.03

26.83

100.03

41

22.03

50.03

28.03

100.03

50

Uninformed
Nonshoppers

25.83

50.03

24.23

100.03

66

Total
Nonshoppers

24.23

50.03

25.83

100.03

116

X2 (rows I and 2) = 2.86, p
X2 (rows I and 3) = 2.78, p

< .3.
< .3.

gagor has an existing relationship with a mortgage institution, he
may feel reasonably secure about going to that institution for a car
loan and will find it convenient to do so.
Other studies have generally succeeded in demonstrating that
knowledge of the interest rate and finance charges that one pays is
related to his assets and income.59 These studies have concluded that
this relationship indicates that consumers use information available
to them in an economically rational manner.60 Our data, however,
are inconsistent with such a conclusion; they show that amount of
income and extent of asset ownership are not directly related to
retention or use of information about competing interest rates.
Thus, it would appear that knowledge of one's own interest rate and
knowledge of competing rates are two different aspects of rate
sensitivity.
59. See authorities cited in note 6 supra, especially F. JUSTER &: R:. SHAY, Due, and
Hoskins.
60. See F. JUSTER&: R. SHAY, supra note 6, at 10.
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Type and Length of Job

In our interview with the HVNB loan officer, we learned that a
prospective borrower may be rated not only by his income, but also
by the type and stability of his job. A white-collar borrower with a
steady employment record may be a more attractive prospect to a
bank than a blue-collar worker who is subject to layoffs. The loan
officer also seemed to respect holders of white-collar jobs for reasons
unrelated to income or to job stability. Therefore, occupation and
length of employment at one's present job are factors that are related to the availability of a low-cost loan. Assuming that borrowers
behave rationally-and that they are aware of these lender preferences--these factors should also be related to one's sensitivity to
interest rates. Table 7 shows that there was indeed a relationship
between the type of job held by our respondents and their propensity to shop. The difference in occupation composition between the
shoppers and the informed nonshoppers was not great, but the
difference between shoppers and uninformed nonshoppers was quite
substantial. Blue-collar workers constituted a significantly higher
proportion of the uninformed nonshopper group than of either of
the informed groups.
TABLE 7
TYPE OF JOB

Shoppers
Informed
Nonshoppers
Uninformed
Nonshoppers
Total
Nonshoppers

White
Collar•

Blue
Collar

Total

N

61.03

39.03

100.03

41

50.03

50.03

100.03

50

39.43

60.63

100.03

66

44.03

56.03

100.03

116

X2 (row 1 and 2) = l.ll, p
X2 (rows 1 and 3) = 5.54, p
• Includes students.

< .28.
< .02.

These results seem to indicate that persons having information
about competing interest rates are more likely to be white-collar than
blue-collar workers and that shoppers tend to be white-collar workers.
Differences in educational background, which are discussed in the
next section, may partially explain these results. These results may
also be due to the fact that rate information may be more readily
available to persons who associate with the best credit risks. Forty-six
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per cent of the informed nonshoppers in our sample had heard of
the lower-cost lender through a friend or co-worker; 61 if the lowercost lenders were already lending largely to white-collar workers, it
is likely that information about these lenders would be spread to
other white-collar workers more effectively than to blue-collar workers.
On the average, the shoppers in our sample had held their
current jobs for a shorter period of time than had the informed
nonshoppers (see Table 8). About the same proportion of both
groups had held their current jobs for more than 5 years. Much
greater proportions of both shoppers and informed nonshoppers had
held their jobs for more than 5 years than had the uninformed
nonshoppers. On the other hand, more shoppers than either informed or uninformed nonshoppers had held their jobs for less than
2 years. These ambiguous findings lead to the conclusion that job
TABLE 8
LENGTH OF SERVICE IN PrulsENT JOB

Shoppers
Informed
Nonshoppers
Uninformed
Nonshoppers
Total
Nonshoppers
X2 (rows 1 and 2)
X2 (rows I and 3)

0-2 Years

2-5 Years

More than
5 Years

Total

N

45.03

10.03

45.03

100.03

40

30.03

24.03

46.03

100.03

50

31.83

31.83

36.43

100.03

66

31.03

28.53

40.53

100.03

116

= 6.94, p < .05.
= 9.61, p < .01.

stability is not a very important factor either in the acquisition of
price information or in the propensity to act on such information.
Therefore, the fact that shoppers tend to be white-collar workers
cannot be explained by the fact that white-collar employment is
more stable than blue-collar work. It is necessary to look at some
other characteristic of white-collar employees-such as their sophistication, education, place of residence, or access to information
through informal channels--to explain why they constitute such a
large proportion of the informed groups.
61. Another 253 read advertisements, and the remaining 293 learned of the lowerrate lender in a variety of other ways (e.g., through a professional credit counselor or
by having borrowed from the lender at some time in the past). See Question II J-3 in
Appendix A.
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D. Education
The relationship between occupation and shopping suggests that
we look next at another socio-economic variable-education. Table
9 shows that, in general, the shoppers in our survey had achieved
higher levels of education than had either group of nonshoppers. In
fact, nearly 663 of the shoppers had attended college. The median
TABLE 9
EDUCATION
Less Than
12 Years
Shoppers
Informed
Nonshoppers
Uninformed
Nonshoppers
Total
Nonshoppers

High School Some College
(12)
(12+)

Total•

N

14.73

19.53

65.83

100.03

41

16.63

39.63

43.83

100.03

48

45.03

25.83

29.33

100.13

58

32.03

32.03

35.83

99.83

106

X2 (rows l and 2) = 4.21, p < .07.
x2 (rows l and 3) = 15 +, p < .001.
• Because percentage figures have been rounded off, the printed figures do not
necessarily total 100.03.

educational attainment for the 2 groups of nonshoppers (12 years)
was slightly less than that for the county as a whole (12.2 years). 62
While it is tempting to interpret the differences in levels of education as a reflection of a difference in sophistication between shoppers
and nonshoppers, our discussion below will show that the differences
in education are also related to place of residence.

E. Place of Residence
A major difficulty in the interpretation of our data on the relative sophistication of shoppers and nonshoppers is that all of HVNB's
branches are located in Ann Arbor. Because of the size of the
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor has a large proportion of
white-collar workers63 and a large percentage of highly educated
persons.~4 Therefore, the relationships that we found between
knowledge and shopping and our respondents' educational attainments and job type might also be explained in part by distance
62. COUNTY &: CITY DATA BooK, supra note 58, at 182.
63. Id. at 505. Of the employed persons in Ann Arbor, 66.23 hold white-collar
jobs. The comparable national figure is 50.43.
64. Id. The median number of years of education for Ann Arbor residents is 13.7
and for all United States residents is 12.2.
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of the residence of borrowers from each of the 3 creditors. It may be
that the best banking opportunities are located near white-collar
places of work and residence. That possibility prevents us from
drawing the conclusion that shopping for low-cost loans is related
to education and occupation. If proximity to a low-cost lender is the
primary factor in a new-car buyer's decision to borrow from that
lender, differences in level of education and white-collar employment may be indicative merely of the fact that HVNB is located only
in Ann Arbor. Table 10 shows there was indeed a correlation beTABLE 10
REsPONDENTS LmNG IN ANN .ARBOR
X2 (shoppers x nonshoppers)

Per Cent

N

Shoppers

78.03

41

Informed
Nonshoppers

58.03

50

X2 (rows 1 and 2) = 3.66,
p
.06

Uninformed
Nonshoppers

45.53

66

X2 (rows 1 and 3) = 20+
p
.001

Total
Nonshoppers

50.93

116

<

<

tween shopping and our respondents' places of residence. Moreover,
controlling the place-of-residence factor dramatically reduces the difference in the educational background, for example, between shoppers and nonshoppers. If we consider only the Ann Arbor residents
in the 3 groups, the difference in percentage of shoppers and nonshoppers respectively with more than 12 years of education declines
from 303 (see Table 9) to 103 (see Table 11 ).
EDUCATION

OF

TABLE 11
REsPONDENTS WITH REsIDENCE IN fu'IN .ARBOR

12 Years
Shoppers
Informed
Nonshoppers
Uninformed
Nonshoppers
Total
Nonshoppers

or less

12 Years
or more

N

34.03

66.03

32

41.43

58.63

29

X2 = .3, not sig.

46.63

53.43

30

X2 = 1, not sig.

44.03

56.03

59

X2 (shoppers x nonshoppers)

Comparative analysis of our 3 groups of respondents has allowed
us to identify some characteristics that seem to be associated with
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borrowers who shop, some that seem to be associated with borrowers
who know of competing interest rates but do not take advantage of
them, and some that seem to be associated with borrowers who
neither shop nor have information.65 We found that the amount of
the debtor's income and the type of assets he held had no significant
relationship to his status as a shopper or nonshopper; in fact, the
nonshoppers earned slightly more money than did the shoppers. In
contrast, we found that those persons with some sophistication in
interpreting interest rates were much more likely to shop. Not surprisingly, we also found that a borrower who knew the rate of
interest he was paying was far more likely to be a shopper than a
nonshopper, that a highly educated person was more likely to be a
shopper than was one who was not highly educated, and that shoppers were more likely to be white-collar workers than blue-collar
workers. While we offer hypotheses for the independent effects that
each of these variables has on shopping, we cannot sort out the
relative contribution of each. Our data strongly suggest that shoppers tend to be middle-class consumers, consumers with fairly conservative buying patterns. From our sample, such consumers seem to
enjoy a variety of advantages: they live near the low-cost lenders, they
are more likely to understand the meaning of the add-on rate of
interest, and, as may be inferred from our interview with a loan officer, banks are likely to pay greater respect to them because of their
white-collar jobs.
The kindest thing that can be said for these findings is that they
are interesting but inconclusive. A variety of factors have confounded our search for certainty. The fact that HVNB, the low-cost
lender, is located only in Ann Arbor, a town whose population has
a disproportionately high level of education, causes us some fear that
in reporting that shoppers are highly educated persons we are really
65. In reading this discussion of the differences between shoppers and both groups
of nonshoppers, one should keep in mind that we have been considering the composition of each of the groups and not the likelihood that a white-collar worker or an
individual with an income under $10,000 will be a shopper. The group that we label
"shoppers" is so small-about 17.5% of our sample-that its members are a small
minority of all those new-car buyers with each of the characteristics we have discussed.
What we have shown is that an individual with certain demographic characteristics-such as high income and white-collar job-is more likely to be a shopper than is one
not possessing such characteristics. But it does not follow that the possession of such
characteristics makes it more likely that a particular individual will be a shopper than
a nonshopper. We have not compared percentages of white-collar workers in each of
the 3 groups because our 3 groups combined do not include all respondents in our
sample and the percentages would not give proportions of a statistically representative
sample of white- and blue-collar workers. Our 3 comparison groups comprise about
65% of our entire sample; the remaining 35% do not fall into any of the groups.
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only saying that a lot of college graduates live in Ann Arbor.
Furthermore, we are inclined to qualify our figures on income
because we believe the HVNB sample included a disproportionately
high number of students who will shortly be high-income earnerspersons who have all of the attributes of a high-income earner but
are now classified as low- or no-income persons because they are still
law or medical students. We must conclude this analysis, then, with
a bit of a disclaimer-we are not sure that our questions plumbed
the depths as well as they might have.

VI.

CONCLUSION

Our principal conclusion is that the consumer loan market, at
least as it is evidenced in the market for new-car loans in Washtenaw
County, is a grossly imperfect one-grossly imperfect, that is, if one
regards it as a market whose single item of cost is the rate of interest
one pays. We found that many who live in the county failed to seek
the lowest-cost loan for which they could have qualified. We conclude that the lack of knowledge of the lower interest rate was not
the principal deterrent to procuring such a loan, but that a variety of
factors, in various combinations, kept the bulk of our respondents
from obtaining a lower-cost loan.
The results of our study suggest that, at least with regard to auto
loans, the disclosure provisions of the Truth-in-Lending Act will
be largely ineffective in changing consumer behavior patterns.66
Certainly the Act will not improve the status of those who already
know that lower rates are available elsewhere. And we discovered no
evidence that knowledge of the interest rate-which, even under the
Act will usually come after a tentative agreement to purchase a
specified car has been reached67-will stimulate a substantial percentage of consumers to shop for a lower rate elsewhere. If there
will be a beneficiary of truth-in-lending, our data indicate that he
will be a middle-class borrower, the man with a better-than-average
job and education, not the blue-collar worker. Our data suggest that
even the relatively affiuent blue-collar employee will not benefit from
rate disclosure; presumably, the low-income blue-collar employee
will benefit even less.
66. Preliminary confirmation from a more recent survey appeared in the N.Y. Times,
Feb. 7, 1971, § A, at 24, col. I. which reported that a Federal Reserve Board survey of
consumers' knowledge of interest rates showed slight improvement between 1969 and
1970.
67. See note 12 supra and accompanying text.
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If truth-in-lending is not a panacea for the imperfections in the
market, then what should legislatures do? One desirable act would
be to break down the barriers that now exist to market entry by new
lenders. Although our study shows that there are many who would
not benefit from the entry of new and lower-cost creditors, none of
the many respondents who borrowed at a low cost from HVNB could
have so benefited prior to its entry into the market in 1963. The
addition of new lenders, of course, does not ensure that there will
be rate competition. Moreover, one suspects that rate competition
will always be limited to big-ticket items. There is always the chance,
however, that the newcomer will see some advantage in offering a
rate differential.
Another possibility for new legislation would be an expansion
of the truth-in-lending laws to require lenders who advertise to disclose in their advertisements the rates at which they make various
loans. The current law provides that lenders who undertake to
advertise interest rates must disclose those rates in specified terms; 68
but lenders remain free to ignore rates entirely in their advertising.
Indeed, a recent GMAC television advertisement features a heavybreathing jogger. The point of the ad is that it is much more convenient to come to GMAC to buy the car and borrow in one spot
than it is to run to one place for insurance, to another place for a
loan, and to a third place for the car. Perhaps GMAC should be
required in such an advertisement to disclose the rate at which it
will lend against new cars. However, our findings make us rather
pessimistic about the effectiveness of disclosures, whenever and however made, in today's market.
Widespread public education, through television and through
the schools, offers greater possibilities. Such education might disclose
some of the tricks of the trade, might teach the public how to compute interest charges, and might encourage more consumers to seek
out lower-cost lenders. Of course, the sample of respondents that
we interviewed were not typical of all consumers; nor did they
represent some of the classes of consumers to whom most concern
should be directed. In this sense we are talking only about consumers who are relatively well-off. It is quite unclear whether relatively affiuent consumers like those we interviewed-even armed
with rate information and brainwashed by television instruction
about finding cheap loans-would change their behavior. If they do
68. Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.IO(d)(l) (1970).
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not, then we suppose that is the consumers' business. If dealing with
"Harry" down at the local dealership instead of with some unknown
banker, if doing one-stop shopping instead of two- or three-stop shopping, and if closing the entire deal on the car at once are all worth
$120 or $130 to the consumer, then why shouldn't we let him spend
his money that way?a9
69. It is worthwhile to emphasize the differences in the authors' approaches to
consumer protection. 'While the data show that most of our respondents were financially well·off, the imperfections that we found in the market do not necessarily reflect
either a lack of interest in savings or some other completely voluntary inaction. It is
true that a consumer need not save his money. But a less well-educated, blue-collar
consumer may show justifiable reluctance to deal with bankers and prefer to deal
instead with "easy-credit" lenders. The HVNB loan officer's statement that he judged
partly on appearance and white-collar job is a tip-off to some of the more subtle
pressures in the credit market that we could not measure. Distances from places of
work and residence to the lower-priced creditors is another. Moreover, even if the
lowest-cost loans were equally available to all, it would seem desirable in a creditoriented society to teach people-especially those with limited resources-how to use
credit wisely. In the alternative, or as a supplement, a form of regulation that both
facilitates the granting of credit to all and that transfers some of the cost of granting
credit to the general public either through better protection or direct subsidy might
be helpful. Until these and other remedies are tried, the "ho-hum" attitude toward
consumer credit seems inappropriate.
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APPENDIX A
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR DEBTORl

(Do not accept other family members.)
I am
from the University of Michigan Law
School. You probably received a letter which said that we would be
calling. As we said in the letter, we are doing a study of consumer
credit in Washtenaw County and of the attitudes and plans of consumers. We have selected your name by chance from a list of people
who bought late model cars in 1967. If you will give me a few minutes
of your time in helping me fill out this questionnaire it will greatly
help our study. All information will be used anonymously. No one's
name will ever appear in the report. We will be happy to send you a
copy of the final report if you want. In fact, it may help you the next
time you buy a car.

Frequency

Percent2

137
44
15
37
2

58.33
18.7
6.4
15.8
0.8

1
62
58
53
33
18

0.43
26.4
24.7
22.6
14.0
4.3
7.7

D. Marital Status:
Married
Widowed
Divorced
Single
N.A.

186
3
13
31
2

79.13
1.3
5.5
13.2
0.9

E. Race:
Black
White

19
209

s.13
88.9

Code

I.

General Information
A. Name:
B. Address:
Ann Arbor
Ypsilanti
Dexter
Other
N.A.a
C. Date of Birth (by age):
10-20 years:
21-30
31-40
41-50
51-60
60+
N.A.

IO

1. Indicating the aggregate of all answers given.
2. Not weighted to compensate for the double proportion of HVNB borrowers.
8. Not available.
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Frequency

Per cent

2
5

0.9
2.1

F. Sex:
Male
Female
N.A.
G. Number of Children Living at Home:
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8+
N.A.

195
34
6

83.03
14.5
2.5

75
36
51
22
17
4
3
2
2
23

31.93
15.3
21.7
9.4
7.2
1.7
1.3
0.9
0.9
9.8

II. First I would like to talk about the general details of the last car
purchase you made.
A. From whom did you borrow:
GMAC
70
29.83
101
AAB
43.0
HVNB
63
26.8
Don't know
1
0.4
B. (If at GMAC or AAB) Did the dealer arrange the loan? If no,
go to C.
128
Yes
54.53
44
No
18.7
HVNB loan (not arranged
by dealer)
62
26.4
1
0.4
N.A.
If yes: I. Was everything taken care of at the dealer's office or did you
go to the GMAC/AAB office?
121
Yes
51.53
7
3.0
No
Dealer did not arrange loan
102
43.4
Don't know, N.A.
5
2.1
2. Did you sign the contract on the same visit to the dealer's
when you orally agreed to buy the car?
Yes
80
34.03
No
47
20.0
Dealer did not arrange loan
102
43.4
Don't know, N.A.
6
2.6
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Frequency

Per cent

3. If you had gotten your loan somewhere else, do you think
that the dealer would have sold you the car for the same
price?
109
Yes
46.43
16
5.8
No
43.4
Dealer did not arrange loan
102
8
3.4
Don't know, N.A.
4. Did you inquire elsewhere about the possibility of a loan?

Yes
No
Dealer did not arrange loan
Don't know, N.A.
If yes: a.

Where?
HVNB
AAB
Other

b. Why didn't you borrow there?
Not cheaper
Present creditor
more convenient
Dealer pressure
Other
Dealer did not arrange or did
not inquire elsewhere
Don't know, NA.
If no: a.

16
115
102
2

7.03
48.9
43.4
0.8

2
3
11

0.93
1.3
4.8

7

3.03

2
I
4

0.9
0.4
1.7

218
3

92.8
1.2

Is there some reason why you did not inquire elsewhere?
Convenient to do business
19
this way, short on time
8.13
Have dealt with this creditor
46
before
19.8
8
Dealer pressure
3.4
Present creditor is cheapest
12
5.1
Low credit rating-had no
choice
4
1.7
Other
27
11.5
Dealer did not arrange or inquired elsewhere
116
49.4
Don't know, N.A.
3
1.3

b. Did the dealer either encourage or discourage you from inquiring elsewhere about a loan?
Encouraged
2
0.93
6
Discouraged
2.6
119
Neither
50.6
Dealer did not arrange loan
103
43.8
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5
Number of
responses
If HVNB or if dealer did not arrange the loan:
Don't know, N.A.
i. How?

1245
Per cent

2.1
10

C. Do you think that if you had financed through the dealer he
would have sold you the automobile at a different price?
Yes
16
6.73
No
70
29.8
Dealer arranged loan
125
53.2
Don't know, N.A.
24
10.2
I. Did the dealer offer to arrange a loan?
Yes
52
22.13
No
50
21.3
Dealer arranged loan
126
53.6
Don't know, N.A.
6
2.5
a. If yes: How did his offer compare with the loan you
actually received?
Higher
20
8.53
Lower
Same
32
13.6
No
50
21.3
Dealer arranged loan
126
53.6
Don't know, N.A.
6
2.5
2. (If not financed at HVNB) Did you mention HVNB?
No respondent mentioned HVNB
3. If the dealer made a competitive offer, why didn't you

accept it?
Easier not to
Cheaper not to
Prefer to do it myself
Hostile to car dealers
Other
No competitive offer, or
dealer arranged loan
Don't know, N.A.

7
2
4
3
4

201
14

3.03
0.9
1.7
1.3
1.7
85.5
5.9

D. (If financed at AAB or HVNB) Is AAB /HVNB your regular
bank?
Yes
120
51.13
No
115
48.9
I. (If no or if financed at GMAC) Is there some reason why
you did not finance the car at your regular bank?
Easier to borrow from present
creditor
7
3.03
Cheaper
20
8.5
Took dealer's advice
7
3.0
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Frequency
Had contact with this creditor before
Other
Don't know, N.A.

IO
16
55

E. How far do you live (work) from the dealer?
0-1 mile
32
1-5
76
~o

w

IO+
Don't know, N.A.

59
9

Per cent
4.3
6.9
23.4
13.63
32.3
25.1
25.I
3.8

F. How far do you live (work) from your regular bank?
0-1 mile
ll5
48.93
1-5
84
35.7
5-10
15
6.4
IO+
12
5.4
Don't know, N.A.
9
3.8
G. (If financed at bank other than regular bank) How far do you
live (work) from the bank where you financed the car?
0-1 mile
8
3.43
~
16
~O

IO+
Financed through regular
bank
Don't know, N.A.

7

u

M

12

5.2

121
71

51.5
30.2

H. What interest rate are you paying on your loan?
4.03
7
4.5
37
5.0
28
5.5
12
6~
51
6.5+
18
Don't know, N.A.
82

3.03
15.7
11.9
5.1
21.7

7.7
34.9

I. Do you know what interest rate banks are paying on savings?

3.53

9

3.83

~

«

I~

4.5
5.0
5.5

65
45
19

27.7
19.1
8.1

l

M

M+

Don't know, N.A.
52
22.l
I. Do you know if it is computed on the same basis?
17
7.23
Respondent says yes
Respondent says no or gives
I04
«.2
explanation
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Frequency
Per cent
Other wrong answer
11.6
27
Don't know, N.A.
87
37.0
2. If you were to pay $6 per hundred on a loan, would you
expect it to cost you the same as interest at 63?
Respondent says yes
67
28.53
Respondent says no or gives
40.0
explanation
94
Other wrong answer
28
12.0
Don't know, N.A.
46
19.5

J.

Do you know of anyone in Washtenaw County who lends at

a lower rate than you borrowed?
Yes
No
If yes: I. Who?

59
172

25.53
74.5

17
HVNB
7.23
3.0
AAB
7
35
15.3
Other
172
74.5
No
2. Did you ask about the possibility of borrowing there?
Yes
5
2.13
No
53
22.6
Don't know anyone lower
173
73.6
N.A.
3
1.7
3. How did you find out about the lower rates? (word of
mouth, ads, etc.)
Word of mouth, general
19
knowledge
8.13
10
Friend or co-worker
4.3
1
Professional advice
0.4
4
Regular prior contact
2.6
Ad
12
5.2
4
Other
1.7
Don't know anyone with
lower rate
175
73.6
10
Don't know, N.A.
4.2
4. Why didn't you borrow there?
4
Took dealer's advice
1.73
Did not believe or trust
2
0.9
Respondent is high credit
4
risk
1.7
Present arrangement is more
21
convenient
8.9
Inconvenience-respondent
believes low-cost creditor
requires more credit references or higher down pay6
ment
2.6
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Frequency
Impossibility-creditor is in
another city, lends only to
members, etc.
Don't know anyone lower
Don't know, N.A., other

10
178
10

Per cent

4.3
75.7
4.3

K. Do you read the Ann Arbor News regularly? The Ypsilanti
Press?
Ann Arbor News
166
70.63
Ypsilanti Press
26
11.1
Neither
28
11.9
Both
12
5.1
N.A.
3
1.3
If yes: I. Have you ever noticed ads concerning rates?
Yes
98
41.73
No
83
35.3
Don't know, N.A., don't read
paper
40
17.1
If yes: a. Who was the advertiser(s)?
HVNB
76
32.33
AAB
8
3.4
Other
14
6.0
GMAC

b. Do you remember the rates advertised?
Yes-4.03 or below
6
Yes-4.5
37
Yes-5.0
7
9
Yes-5.5+
45
No
Recalls ad was for cheap loan
4
N.A., does not read paper, or
did not see ads
127

2.63
15.7
3.0
3.8
19.1
1.7
54.1

L. Do you know the total amount of the finance charge on your
loan?
Respondent's guess was three
times greater than actual
3
finance charge
1.33
0.9
2-3 times
2
18
7.7
1.25-2 times
60
25.5
.75-1.25 times
11
4.7
.50-.75 times
5
less than .50 finance charge
2.2
Actual finance charge una59
25.1
vailable
Don't know and did not guess
32.8
77
at finance charge
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Per cent

III. Have you ever bought a new car before?
Yes
No
N.A.

188

43
4

80.03
18.3
1.7

If yes:

A.

Have you ever dealt with - - - - - - - before?
dealer
I. l£ yes, did he arrange your financing before?
2. If no, when you bought your car from other dealers, did
did they arrange your financing?
Yes, same dealer arranged
43
loan
18.33
Yes, same dealer did not ar33
14.0
range
Yes, different dealer who ar62
26.4
ranged loan
Yes, different dealer who did
50
not arrange loan
21.3
43
18.3
Never bought new car before
N.A.
4
1.7
3. If no, why did you have the dealer arrange it this time?

Dealer did not arrange last
loan or never bought new
car before
Easier
Cheaper
Could not pay cash this time
Other
N.A.
B.

200
9

2
4
8
12

85.13
3.8
0.9
I.7
3.5
5.1

Did you deal with - - - - - - - when you previously
bank or GMAC
bought a new car?
116
Yes
49.33
64
No
27.l
Never bought new car before
48
20.4
Don't know, N.A.
3.0
7
I. If no, can you tell me why you switched to _ _ _ _ _?
bank or
GMAC
(convenience, lower rates, service, dealer influencing)
Lower interest
20
8.53
Convenience
16
6.8
Dealer's recommendation
8
3.4
Other
20
8.5
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Frequency

Per cent

2. If yes, why did you stay with the same company?
Convenient or the present
creditor is regular bank
45
19.13
Familiar with this creditor
and trust him
47
20.0
Lower interest rate
15
6.4
Dealer's recommendation
9
3.8
C. Have you ever borrowed from other banks or finance companies?
Yes
151
64.33
No
74
31.5
IO
N.A.
4.2
I. If yes, did you consult them about financing the car?
15
6.43
Consulted
Did not consult
136
57.9
Never borrowed from another
creditor or N.A.
84
35.7
2. Why or why not?
Respondents who consulted another creditor:
Know and trust him
5
2.13
Gave him first chance because borrowed there beIO
fore
4.3
Respondent was turned down
Did not consult, had never
borrowed before, or N.A.
220
93.6
Respondents who did not consult another creditor:
Did not consult because:
Other more expensive or
38
tougher on late payments
16.23
5
Fear of refusal
2.1
58
Convenience
24.7
7
Dealer pressure
3.0
Other creditor does not make
auto loans or is not local
bank
28
11.9
Consulted other, never borrowed from other, or N.A.
99
42.1
D. Do you work during banking hours?
Yes
No
Don't know banking hours
I. What hours do you work?
Day shift
Night or afternoon shift
N.A.

179
43
13

78.23
17.3
5.5

ll2
6
ll7

47.73
2.6
49.7
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Per cent

2. Were the hours the bank stays open important in selecting
your bank?
Yes
62
26.43
No
166
70.6
N.A.
2.9
7
IV. Future Transactions
A. When you buy your next car, do you think you will borrow
?
from
bank or GMAC
Yes
143
60.83
No
60
25.5
Pay cash next time
6
2.6
Don't know, N.A.
26
11.0
B. Is there anything you particularly like about
?
bank or GMAC
?
C. Is there anything you particularly dislike about
bank or
GMAC
83
No likes, no complaints
35.33
Complaints about loan ser5
2.1
vice
78
Satisfied customer
33.2
Satisfied with loans (specific24
10.2
ally)
This creditor easier on late
payments, or easy credit
18
7.7
Mixed reaction-some likes,
some complaints
21
9.0
Don't know, N.A.
4
1.7

D. Have you recommended - - - - - - - to anyone?
bank or GMAC
I. If yes, what did you recommend?
Recommended generally to
3
relative
I.33
Recommended generally to
0.4
friend
1
Recommended loan service to
anyone
34
14.4
Other recommendations
52
22.l
No recommendations
140
59.6
Don't know, N.A.
2.1
5
E. Has anyone recommended any other bank or finance company
to you? If yes, what did they recommend about it?
Recommended HVNB loans
9
3.83
Recommended HVNB for any
other reason
11
4.7
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Frequency

Per cent

12

5.1

33

14.0
70.6
1.7

166
4

V. The final set of questions concerns the kind of information
- - - - - - - asked of you when they decided that you were
bank or GMAC
a good borrower. We are trying to find out how the banks decide
whom they will finance and whom they will not finance. As I
said before, the information you give will be strictly confidential,
and your name will never appear. We are just trying to find out
how banks and finance companies work.
A. How far have you gone in school? (Hand card to person.)
Less than 6th grade
3
1.33
~
21
~
9-11
27
11.5
High school graduate
65
27.7
13-15
30
12.8
16+, college graduate
73
31.l
16
6.8
N.A.

B. What was your job(s) at the time you purchased your car?
1. Who was your employer(s) at the time of purchase?
Not Coded
2. How long had you been working there at the time of
purchase?
36
15.33
Less than 1 year
11.5
27
1-2
54
23.0
2-5
35
14.9
5-10
64
27.2
10+
13
5.5
Unemployed or student
6
2.5
N.A.
3. What kind of work did you do there at the time of
purchase?
36
Salaried professional
15.33
8
3.4
Salaried engineer
5
2.1
Self-employed professional
18
Self-employed manager
7.7
22
9.4
Salaried management
21
8.9
Other white collar
Semi-skilled or skilled blue
41
17.4
collar
68
Unskilled blue collar
28.9
3
1.3
N.A.
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Per cent
Frequency
C. Do you:
45
1. Own your own house?
19.13
118
50.2
2. Pay on a mortgage?
66
28.1
3. Rent?
6
N.A.
2.5
D. Did you own any other assets at the time of the purchase?
Stocks or bonds
8
3.43
Checking account only
23
9.8
Savings account
88
37.4
Real property and savings account
27
11.5
Stocks or bonds and some
60
25.5
savings
Real property and stocks or
bonds
4
1.7
Real property, stocks or
15
bonds, and savings
6.4
N.A.
3.0
7
Life insurance
30
Less than $15,000
12.83
15-30,000
16
6.8
30-50,000
12
5.1
50,000+
7
3.0
Did not or would not give
amount
134
57.0
No life insurance
27
11.5
N.A.
9
3.8
E. (If respondent had savings or stocks)
1. Some people use their savings or sell stock to purchase
an automobile. Why did you choose instead to borrow?
3.03
Easier to do so
7
Cheaper in the long run, or
it would establish my
credit
28
11.9
Reluctance to use savings
71
30.2
Dealer pressure
Did not have enough savings
68
28.9
Other
8
3.4
Used savings
3
1.3
Don't know
12
5.1
N.A., or no savings
29
12.3
2. a. If the interest on your loan had been 123 per year,
would you have used your savings or sold your stock instead of borrowing?
b. Even if the monthly payment would have been the
same?
Yes, would do different to
105
both parts
44.73
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Frequency

Per cent

8

3.4

56
4

23.9
1.7

62

26.4

F. If no savings, stocks, or bonds:
If the interest on your loan had been 123 per year instead of
what you are paying, would you have acted differently in
buying your car or getting your loan (e.g., put off purchase,
purchase cheaper car, etc.)?
Yes, would not have borrowed
2
0.93
Yes, would have put off pur23
9.8
chase
Yes, other
IO
4.3
No, no change
16
6.8
Had savings, or N .A.
184
78.3
G. Did your wife (husband) work at the time of the purchase?
(kind of work, etc.)
11
Salaried professional
4.73
Salaried engineer
Self-employed professional
Self-employed manager
3
1.3
Salaried manager
3
1.3
Other white collar
2
0.9
Skilled and semi-skilled
3
1.3
47
Unskilled
20.0
136
Does not work
57.8
30
N.A.
12.8
H. What was her (his) income category?
Under $3,000
3,000-4,999
5,000-7,499
7,500-9,999
10,000-12,499
12,500-14,999
15,000-19,999
20,000 and up
Does not work
N.A.

3
12
3
4
1
1
1
136
74

1.33
5.1
1.3
1.7
0.4
0.4
0.4
57.8
31.9
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Per cent

Into which category did your family income fall at the time
of the purchase?
Under $3,000
2
0.93
9
3,000-4,999
3.8
5,000-7,499
28
11.9
7,500-9,999
22.6
53
48
20.4
10,000-12,499
11.5
27
12,500-14,999
31
13.2
15,000-19,999
9.4
over 20,000
22
15
6.4
N.A.
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APPENDIX B
INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM FINANCING STATEMENTsl

I. Name of Debtor:

2. Address of Debtor:
3. Phone number:
4. Type of car and model:
5. a) Total price + insurance:

Code

Frequency

$0-1800
1801-2200
2201-2500
2501-2800
2801-3000
3001-3200
3201-3500
3501-4200
4201+
N.A.2

24
17
39
27
28
29
25
16
28

0.43
10.2
7.2
16.6
11.5
11.9
12.3
10.6
6.8
11.3

8
18
29
34
37
28
33
20
28

3.43
7.7
12.3
14.5
15.7
11.9
14.0
8.5
11.3

2
22
25
54
39
29
38

0.93
9.4
10.6
23.0
16.6
12.3
16.2
4.3
6.8

I

Per cent

b) Down payment or trade-in:
$0
1-200
201-300
301-500
501-700
701-1000
1001-1500
1501+
N.A.
c) Total time balance:
$0-1000
1001-1600
1601-2000
2001-2600
2601-3000
3001-3400
3401-4200
4201+
N.A.

IO
16

I. See note 16 supra and accompanying text.
2. Not available. Some financing statements included only the minimum amount
of information required by statute. See note 16 supra. In most cases, a copy of the
entire security agreement had been filed.
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Code

Per cent

d) Interest rate (add-on):
61
37
15
IOI
4
17

4.53
5.0
5.5
6.0
6.5
N.A.

26.03
15.7
6.4
43.0
1.7
7.2

6. Total number of months over which payments are to be made:
Less than 6 mos.
6-12 mos.
12-18 mos.
18-24 mos.
24-36 mos.
N.A.

4
11
6
24
174
16

1.73
4.7
2.6
10.2
74.0
6.8

12
27
31
34
34
26
20
25
8
18

5.13
11.5
13.2
14.5
14.5
II.I
8.5
I0.6
3.4
7.6

7. Amount of monthly payments:

$ 0-50
51-60
61-70
71-80
81-90
91-IOO
IOI-110
111-150
150+
N.A.

8. Amount of last payment if more than $1 different:
9. Name and address of assignee:
IO. Name of cosigner, if any:
II. Contract signed by dealer:

Yes
No
N.A.

154
58
23

65.53
24.7
9.8

